Effective Trade Execution by Cesari, Riccardo et al.
 
 
1 
Effective Trade Execution1 
 
 
RICCARDO CESARI 
Department of Statistics, University of Bologna 
 
MASSIMILIANO MARZO 
Department of Economics, University of Bologna 
 
PAOLO ZAGAGLIA 
Department of Economics, University of Bologna 
 
 
This version: June 2012  
 
 
ABSTRACT 
This paper examines the role of algorithmic trading in modern 
financial markets. Additionally, order types, characteristics, and 
special features of algorithmic trading are described under the lens 
provided by the large development of high frequency trading 
technology. Special order types are examined together with an 
intuitive description of the implied dynamics of the order book 
conditional to special orders (iceberg and hidden). The chapter 
provides an analysis of the transaction costs associated with trading 
activity and examines the most common trading strategy employed in 
the market. It also examines optimal execution strategy with the 
description of the Efficient Trading Frontier. These concepts represent 
the tools needed to understand the most recent innovations in 
financial markets and the most recent advances in microstructures 
research.  
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1. INTRODUCTION  
 
The traditional view about financial market organizations is that market 
participants meet to exchange securities in their respective interests and positions. 
According to this wisdom, intermediaries (brokers or dealers) conduct floor trades 
with the goal of finding the various matches between market participants. 
Technological advances represent a critical component relative to the evolution of 
market organization. The strong development of technology adoption results in an 
increased speed of financial transactions by gradually reducing the importance of 
physical location on the trading floor.  
 
Moreover, the search for liquidity, which is  the tension of the trading industry 
towards the minimization of execution costs and trade impact, creates room for an 
increase in the number of competing trading venues. The resulting international 
trading landscape is characterized by a substantial amount of automated trading 
technologies employed in the trading activity and an increase of market fragmentation 
with the emergence of several trading venues and the consequent emergence of 
competition for the order flow. The adoption of Algorithmic Trading (AT) and High 
Frequency Trading (HFT) is the direct consequence of this competition.  
This paper explores the role of innovation in trading activity and its impact on 
the various order characteristics, trading strategies and costs in the recent evolution of 
market microstructure literature. The rapidly evolving scenario witnessed by the role 
of trading algorithms results in a very important set of changes in the market 
architecture, regarding optimal order size, market timing strategies, information 
disclosure, and competition among trading venues and market participants. Existing 
microstructure theories are being re-evaluated as a result of the expanding role of AT 
and HFT.  
 
AT results in implementing a set of trading strategies or “algorithms” that often 
involve computer-based implementation. An algorithm is a set of decision rules and 
strategies used to satisfy a specific goal. HFT is an evolution of AT. HFT represents the 
implementation of proprietary trading strategies by agents by adopting fast 
technological computing to realize trading at very high frequencies and extremely low 
latencies (below 10 microseconds). The main drivers of AT and HFT can be identified 
according to the following elements: (1) the market access model; (2) the fee structure; 
and (3) latency reduction and increases in competition and fragmentation of the order 
flow.  
 
The market access model has evolved in an important way. In the past, 
designated intermediaries (brokers or market makers) had the role of collecting orders 
from their customers and allocated them to appropriate market venues. This business 
model has evolved over time by qualifying the market access in two ways: (1) direct 
market access (DMA) and (2) sponsored access (SA). With DMA, investors can directly 
place their orders in the marketplace by using the broker’s infrastructure of access to 
the market. In this case, brokers do not intervene in the order placement mechanisms: 
their role is only to provide the infrastructure to their clients to gain access to the 
market, after only a pre-trade risk check.  
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With SA, an agent (which could be an investment firm, a private wealthy client, 
or a mutual fund) can have access to the market without being a member of the floor 
by using the broker’s member ID, without necessarily using the latter’s infrastructure. 
If the trading venue provides filtered SA, then the broker can implement pre-trade risk 
checks. Conversely, if the market provides “naked’ access,” then the sponsor does a 
preliminary check to protect his own risk exposure.  The main advantage of SA over 
DMA is the strong reduction of latency, which makes SA more attractive for AT of HFT 
operators.  
 
The recent evolution of policies implemented at the level of each market 
exchange results in a strong increase in fee competition among trading venues and 
attracts the highest possible quantity of the order flow. Market participants reducing 
liquidity from the market are charged a higher fee, while traders increasing liquidity 
are charged a lower fee or are provided with a rebate. BATS, Chi-X and Turquoise, 
which are some specific trading venues used to raise the competition for the order 
flow, implemented this fee structure for the first time, Given the implementation of 
such aggressive trading schemes, all European exchanges have lowered their fees to 
avoid losing order flow. If an order is incorrectly implemented, substantial risk exists 
that the order is no longer appropriate in terms of price limit or size, because the order 
may be executed at an improper price or even not executed at all. In this context, the 
design of a proper infrastructure minimizing the communication delay between 
market and traders is crucial in allowing execution of data receipt, order submissions, 
and confirmations at the highest possible speed. Further, reading the full order book in 
real time and designing the more appropriate trading strategy is one of the key drivers 
of a successful trading strategy. Latency minimization goals are generally obtained by 
co-locating servers of market participants directly close to the market’s infrastructure.  
 
Regulation results in an increased role of algorithmic trader. In many cases, 
laws encourage market fragmentation and, at the same time, competition among 
market venues. In this case, the availability of tools that allow traders to place or cancel 
orders on multiple venues is essential to the ability to generate profits from arbitrage as 
a result of the lowest possible trading fees.  Gomber et al. (2011) point out that 
regulatory changes are one of the key drivers of the recent innovations in financial 
markets.   
 
This paper provides an overview of the most recent advances in trading 
systems and strategies, together with the cost of benefits of their respective 
implementations. The topics discussed in this chapter are presented in a sequential 
order. The next section presents the various definitions of AT, HFT, qualifying their 
importance in the current evolution of trading technologies. Next, the reader is 
introduced in the various order types: to appreciate trading execution techniques, the 
third section presents the definitions of basic limit and market orders together the most 
common instructions currently adopted in the trading practice (Fill or Kill, Immediate 
or Cancel, and so on). Having established the general terminology, a special section is 
dedicated to the description of the main algorithms, classified according to impact 
driven, cost-driven and opportunistic: within this context we will analyze the main 
characteristics of Volume Weighted Average Price (VWAP), Percent of Volume (POV), 
Time Weighted Average Price (TWAP) algorithms.  The choice of execution is 
conditional to pre and post-trade analysis needed to estimate transaction costs 
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involved in trading activity: this is discussed in a separate section where all the types 
of transaction costs both explicit and implicit are presented, following and extending 
the concept of Implementation Shortfall by Perold (1988). The choice of a trading 
strategy can be presented as an optimization problem: this is discussed in the section 
entitled “Optimal Execution Strategies”, where it is presented the approach leading to 
the trading path which minimizes transaction costs, together with the concept of 
Efficient Trading Frontier highlighted by Almgren and Chriss (2000). A final step is 
about the practical implementation of the concept discussed. In a final section the 
Execution Tactics divided in Impact-driven, Price Risk driven and Opportunistic are 
presented with a special emphasis to hidden and iceberg order. The final section 
concludes. Basically, the first two sections introduce the reader to the main language 
and definitions. Then the next step is a general descriptions of the algorithms. To be 
implement efficiently an algorithm we need to understand the constraints: these are 
basically given by transaction costs. The design of an optimal trading strategy delivers 
a set of alternatives classified according to trade aggressiveness: this originates the 
Efficient Trading Frontier.  The path for our presentation starts from definitions to 
bring the reader to the construction of optimal and implementable trading strategies.   
 
 
2. TRADING ALGORITHMS CLASSIFICATION 
 
The first problem when exploring the subjects of AT is the lack of a consistent set of 
definitions regarding algorithmic processes. However, Gomber et al. (2011) contends 
that HFT may be viewed as a subgroup of AT as professional traders observe market 
parameters or other information in real time and properly design specific trading 
strategies aimed at achieving specific goals without human intervention. These goals 
generally apply to DMA or SA technologies for order routing.  
 
The main characteristics of AT include the following: (1) automated order 
submission; (2) automated order management; and (3) use of DMA. In contrast, the 
main characteristics of HFT include the following: (1) the ability to handle a large 
number of orders; (2) rapid order cancellation; (3) proprietary trading; (4 no significant 
position at the end of day; (5) a very short holding period and low latency requirement; 
and (6) co-location/proximity services. According to the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC), HFT refers to “professional traders acting in a proprietary capacity 
that engages in strategies that generate a large number of trades on a daily basis.” 
Brogaard (2010) estimates that HFT accounts for more than 50 percent of the overall 
daily volume on equity markets.  
 
With the massive use of computerized trading system, market making has 
experienced further evolution: traders simultaneously quote buy and sell limit orders 
to profit from bid-ask differences. In some circumstances, this evolution is specifically 
imposed by market regulation, such as for the Designated Market Maker at the New 
York Stock Exchange (NYSE) or the Designated Sponsor via the trading system XETRA 
at the Frankfurt Stock Exchange. Basically, this feature highlights market making with 
obligations for registered market makers. Therefore, a close link exists between market 
making and HFT: designated liquidity provisions are a specific subset of rules of the 
market making strategies, which can be very efficiently implemented by using HFT. At 
the same time, non-mandatory market making strategies and not necessarily linked to 
 
 
5 
liquidity provisions can be implemented with HFT. Market fragmentation allows 
traders to choose the best trading venue in terms of price discovery mechanism and 
liquidity.  
 
Quantitative Portfolio Management (QPM) refers to the technical ability of 
portfolio managers to relate stock movements to other market data. This approach has 
the main goal of monitoring large securities portfolios for a prolonged period of time, 
as opposed to HFT where positions tend to be liquidated overnight. Greater human 
intervention can occur by using QPM. The strategy uses algorithms to generate trading 
decisions based on statistical calculations and data analysis techniques. QPMs are built 
in order to make automated analysis and decisions related to portfolio selection. The 
generation of trading signals is a consequence of previous analysis. This process can be 
automated as well, but the human role intervenes in the verification of the analysis and 
the trading strategies to be implemented. In principle, QPM differs from HFT since the 
latter does not have the goal of portfolio optimization and selection. On the other hand, 
the increasing role of latency and computer speed makes the distinction between HFT 
and QPM more evanescent.  
 
An interesting aspect emerges as a consequence of both increased 
fragmentation and transaction in the role of Smart Order Routing (SOR) systems.  SOR 
systems allow access simultaneously to several venues or liquidity pools to search for 
the best order destination to optimize order execution to minimize implicit and explicit 
trading costs. In practice, SORs scan predefined markets in terms of bid/ask quotes in 
real time and direct the order in a dynamic way toward the best venue offering more 
convenient conditions at the time of order entry. This process is an extremely 
complicated because achieving the best results requires disposing of a routing system 
able to screen in real time the entire order flow/order book composition of each 
trading venue in the market together with the price evolution and to compute the total 
execution costs of each trades in each different market, by applying the explicit cost 
dimension (commissions, fees and taxes). This activity is mainly reserved for fully 
automated systems for HFT, which have the ability to reduce search costs and increase 
search speed across trading venues.  
 
Overall the assessment of AT and HFT misses the fact that both procedures 
represent one of the most important advances in modern market arena. Given the large 
complexity of actions traders must implement (risk exposure analysis, gross position 
netting, matching order size and strategies with regulations and market rules and so 
on), algorithms can be of great help in mitigating cognitive limits associated with the 
human mind and behavior in collecting and processing large masses of information in 
a few seconds. Another benefit of algorithms is their ability to provide liquidity when 
it is scarce.  
 
Biais, Foucault, and Moinas (2010) maintain that there is a problem of adverse 
selection after the introduction of algorithms. Asymmetric information emerges 
between slow and fast traders: fast traders observe information before other agents. 
Because fast traders can profit from such knowledge, slow traders lose. The authors 
show that the increase in algorithm trading might cause an increase of adverse 
selection costs when slow traders are evicted from the market. Empirically, Jovanovic 
and Menkveld (2010) have verified this when fast algorithm trader enters Chi-X (a 
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Dark Pool listed in the Dutch Market). A fast drop in volume is clearly documented, 
probably due to slow traders pulling away from the market. The risk with AT and HFT 
is then given by a multiplicity of equilibria where identifying positive and negative 
effects is possible. At the moment, no strong evidence either favors or opposes 
algorithms.  
 
 
3. ORDER TYPES AND TRADING STRATEGIES  
 
A distinction exits between two types of orders in the market: limit orders and 
market orders. With a limit order, a trader specifies and orders to buy (or sell) a 
quantity of securities at a pre-specified price. A market order is an instruction to trade a 
given quantity at the best possible price. The main difference between the two types of 
orders involves the immediacy need: the market order is a demand of immediacy 
expressed by a trader because it does not impose a price limit on the transaction. As a 
result, market orders have a high probability of being executed. Uncertainty 
surrounding this type of order relates to the execution price. Conversely, a limit order 
fixes a price limit above or below which the order should not be executed. For a buy 
limit order, the execution must occur at or below the limit price; while for sell limit 
order, the execution must take place at or above the price limit. Limit orders are more 
uncertain than market orders because if the book does not contain a proper match, the 
order either will expire or remain unexecuted. If the order is partially executed, a 
residual quantity can be left on the order book.  
 
Additional instructions can be attached to the main order. Some of the most 
common features include the following:  
 
 Fill or Kill (FOK): A fill or kill instruction ensures that either the order gets 
executed immediately in full or not at all. 
 Immediate or Cancel (IOC): An immediate or cancel instruction states that any 
portion of the order that cannot be executed immediately against any order on 
the book is cancelled. IOC orders can be associated with both market orders 
and limit orders. When a limit price is inserted, the order will execute as the 
required quantity is available.  
 All or none (AON): This instruction forces a 100 percent completion requirement 
on an order. The focus after inserting this instruction in not on immediacy. In 
fact, there might be some persistence of the order on the book.  
 
According to the time duration of presence on the order book, orders are 
classified in the following manner:   
 
 GTD, Good Til Date: The order remains active until the end of the 
trading session at the pre-specified date. For example: GTW, for 
Good This Week; GTM, for Good This Month. 
 GTC, Good Til Cancel: The order should stay active until the user 
specifically cancels it (Good Till Expiration).  
 GAT, Good After Time Date: The order allows control over when it 
becomes active. This type of order is useful for broker systems 
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where clients may choose to spread orders over the day. In trading 
algorithms, this instruction is a start-time parameter initializing the 
trading process.  
 
Among the different order types, various preferencing and directed instructions 
may exist. Such instructions allow directing orders toward a specific broker or dealer 
or trading venue. The order can contain the routing instructions including the price 
and quantity instructions.  
Some specific routing instructions are:  
 
• Order protection rules in the US: Brokers and venues are responsible for finding 
the best price. The host venue should either reject or forward the order to the 
market when achieving a better price is possible.  
• Additional instructions: Such instructions as Do not Route or Inter-Market Sweep 
allow for better control on the order routing. 
 
A specific and interesting order instruction is represented by flash orders. These 
orders display the source venue for a short period before being routed to another 
destination. The idea underlying such orders involves the possibility offered to a trader 
of achieving the best price. Only AT and HFT can exploit the advantage emerging from 
flash orders because technological requirements are binding. These types of orders are 
under scrutiny because of the advantage assigned to specific traders. In some senses, 
the asymmetric information phenomena previously discussed becomes part of the 
problem.  
 
Hybrid order mechanisms combine features typical of limit orders together 
with those of market orders. An example of this combination is given by market with 
protection orders, whose goal is to offer the immediate execution of a market order 
with the protection of a price limit. In this type of order, the limit price is established as 
being different from the last execution price. This type of order balances the certainty 
of execution and certainty of price.  
 
Sometimes, specifying the conditions for the execution of a given order may be 
useful. Under these conditions, conditional order types emerge. Such orders are valid 
under a given set of conditions, usually determined by the limit assigned to the market 
price. If the specific conditions (say, with respect to the price limit) are met, then the 
order is effectively executed.  
 
Stop orders (sometimes also called stop loss orders) become binding when the 
market price reaches a given threshold. In this case, they are transformed into market 
orders. In continuous trading, the triggering price is the last traded price. In an open 
outcry auction, the triggering price is the closing price. Activation occurs for buy 
orders when the market price hits the stop price or above. For sell orders, activation 
occurs when the market price goes below the threshold. For example, suppose an 
investor initiated a long position at a price of 10. It the price increases to 11, a stop sell 
order is placed at 11 as a means of protection. If the price trend reverts, the stop 
threshold will be triggered. Alternatively, the stop order is never implemented. Such 
order types are implemented and combined with the market with protection order 
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types in order to increase the probability of execution and to obtain strong price 
controls.  
 
Next, this paper discusses hidden orders and iceberg orders. These types of 
orders are at the core of the functioning of some specific venues, such as the “dark 
pools,” where the identity of traders is hidden alternatively or jointly with the full size 
of the order book. Transparency in financial markets allows traders to correctly track 
demand and supply. Conversely, when some traders need to exchange large size 
orders, consequences may be too strong based on the price patterns. For example, a 
large order might convey wrong information to the whole market and might generate 
herd behavior, which, in turn, could cause strong oscillations. For these reasons, many 
trading venues often allow the retention of large orders hidden in the book. Moreover, 
a compromise between hidden orders and visible orders is represented by iceberg 
orders, where only a fraction of the order is made visible to the market. If the market 
allows hidden orders, traders can participate without revealing their positions to the 
market. To further illustrate, consider the example reported in Table 1 that presents the 
order book for trades of a given stock.  
 
(Insert Table 1 about here) 
 
Currently, a market order is hidden to purchase 2,000 shares of stock. The book 
outlined in Table 1 represents the situation before the order is sent to the market. If the 
order is kept hidden, after the order has been routed to the venue and executed, the 
book after the execution can be represented to the right, where the depiction of the 
effects on the sell side of the book with 1000 shares being matched with the initial 
order. Note that the order does not appear on the buy side since it is a hidden order. As 
a market order, it does not have price priority and can immediately be matched with 
the best prices offered by the sell side. Secondly, after having executed half of the order 
(1,000 shares), the remaining part becomes latent, standing on the book. If an IOC is 
issued to sell additional 1,000 shares at 51, the investor can “ping” the market to 
attempt to cross with the remaining portion of the order. If an order to sell occurs, and 
the order is executed, the implication is that on the book there was a hidden order 
ready to be exchanged.  
 
A different pattern can be observed for iceberg orders. In this case, only a small 
part is visible, with the remaining portion of the order hidden. The visible portion of 
the order is virtually non evindent from other types of limit orders. When the visible 
portion of the order is executed, the trading system slices a new order from the hidden 
part until the whole order is completed. The visible part has time priority, while the 
hidden portion has only price priority.  
 
(Insert Table 2 about here) 
 
Consider the example of the iceberg order from Table 2. In the table on the left 
side, a portion of the sell order S1 has been issued on the book, the whole order is H1, 
which is not visible. When order S1 at a price of 51 is executed, a new portion of the 
hidden order is released from the hidden order H1 and is included in the book as order 
S4. If there were two hidden orders at the same price, time priority indicates which 
order gets executed first.  
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The current market practice has created a more granular structure of orders. In 
the present context, this paper limits its treatment to the most important. The next 
section discusses the main trading strategies and related algorithm selection.  
 
 
4. ALGORITHM SELECTION  
 
As discussed previously, an algorithm identifies a set of instructions to accomplish a 
specific trading task. Three types of algorithm are described below:  
 
 Impact driven algorithms: These algorithms attempt to minimize the overall 
market impact. They are established in order to reduce the effect that trading 
activity might have on the market price.  
 Cost-driven algorithms: The underlying goal of a cost-driven algorithm is cost 
minimization. These algorithms do not take into account market impact, timing 
risk, and other related factors such as the measures of benchmarking and 
implementation shortfall.  
 Opportunistic algorithms: These algorithms take advantage of market evolutions  
 
4.1 Impact-driven Algorithms 
The most common impact algorithms are named time weighted average price 
(TWAP) and volume weighted average price (VWAP). The general feature of such 
algorithms is that they focus of the behavior of a pre-specified benchmark and track it 
systematically with limited sensitivity to market conditions.  
 
TWAP 
A example of TWAP is represented by the strategy to buy 10,000 shares of a given 
asset. Two strategies are possible. First, a trader could issue regular-sized orders to buy 
500 shares every 15 minutes for five hours. A second strategy can be implemented such 
that the trader issues an order to buy 1,000 shares every 15 minutes for 2.5 hours. The 
trade profile is very simple and can be easily forecasted, implying a signalling risk. 
After systematically observing the behavior exhibited with such trades, the 
market can easily forecast the next trade and implement actions that may create 
adverse price movements. After the trading pattern is discovered, the only unknown to 
the market is the total size of the order. An alternative to this behavior might consist of 
inserting a tilting factor, acceleration or deceleration of the order size, after an 
established threshold of the total order has been fulfilled.  
As an example, the trader may insert a tilting factor that results in the order 
executing more quickly after 30 percent of the total order has been executed. Another 
alternative is the insertion of a randomized approach that can be adjusted according to 
the position the fulfilment of the order has been completed. In general, the tilting factor 
defines the degree of aggressiveness attached to the algorithm. An aggressive strategy 
occurs when a larger percentage of the order is executed earlier. In contrast, a passive 
strategy occurs when the order size is smoothed out over time. The algorithm is 
generally completed by the presence of some parameters, such as an on/off switch that 
highlights how far the order might be from the benchmark. Another choice parameter 
is the frequency of trades and the degree of randomization of the trade sizes.  
The more aggressive the order strategy, the greater is the price impact 
associated with the trade. The primary shortcoming of the TWAP strategy is associated 
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with a passive strategy. An alternative to the passive strategy involves implementing a 
trading schedule with a dynamical adjustment path that evolves according to the 
general market conditions.  
 
VWAP 
The main property of VWAP is its ability to design trading strategies according to the 
total market volume. More generally, the definition of the VWAP is given by Equation 
(1):  
       
∑     
 
   
∑   
 
   
     (1) 
where Vi is the size of the ith trade and Pi is the price associated to the ith trade. VWAP 
identifies the ratio of total traded value to the total traded quantity. In Equation (1), n 
represents the number of trades. The main way in which VWAP differs from TWAP is 
by the n variable: the total number of trades when the strategy is formulated can be 
unknown. Estimation methods on the basis of historical volume can be used to solve 
for the optimal number of trades. Kissel and Glantz (2003) contend that the optimal 
trading strategy can be found by using Equation (2):  
                (2) 
where zj is the percentage of daily volume traded; X is the total volume traded; and Xj 
is the target quantity. Thus, VWAP can be re-interpreted as shown in Equation (3):  
          ∑    ̅ 
 
        (19.3) 
where Pj is the average price level in each period. According to Equation (3), VWAP is 
defined as the weighted average value of the prices associated with trades executed to 
implement a given strategy.  
 
The VWAP trading activity is dependent on the historical pattern of the trading 
volume, not from actual volume or actual price changes. The performance evaluation 
of VWAP is given by how closely it tracks the target and predicted market values. If 
historical and actual market values do not differ substantially, then the performance of 
the VWAP strategy will not suffer. The performance of the VWAP strategy is less 
effective if there are substantial differences between historical and actual traded 
volume.  
 
VWAP can be complemented by special tracking parameters that monitor how 
closely the algorithm tracks the target together with trending or tilting instructions. 
The objective of the VWAP strategy is to adjust the trade path to closely target the 
execution method.  
 
Percent of Volume (POV) 
POV is an algorithm designed to closely target the market volume. In fact, with TWAP 
and VWAP, the trading schedule is deterministically determined, independent on the 
market volume. Conversely, the trading schedule based on POV is dynamically 
adjusted. The deterministic choice involves the proportion of market volume, or 
participation rate, that is to be targeted  For example, by establishing a 10 percent 
participation rate, the POV algorithm implies an order submission strategy equal to 10 
percent of the total market volume (or possibly associated with either the buy or sell 
side of the order book). As a result, the trader no longer has any certainty about the 
trade completion within a specific time period because trade size is dependent on total 
market volume. Although POV is similar to VWAP, the difference is given by the 
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actual volume employed by POV as opposite to historical or estimated volume 
employed by VWAP. In practice, POV reacts to repeated trades i trading target with 
the observed value.  Clearly, the trade sizes need to be adjusted to take into account the 
own trading. The adjustment factor is given by 1/ (1-pr) where pr is the participation 
rate.  
 
One of the main problems associated with this algorithm is given by the 
competition for liquidity. If several traders adopt a similar algorithm for trading 
illiquid assets, the direct consequence can be a strong price pressure as liquidity is 
reduced by absorbing available market volume. Thus, using this algorithm is often 
accompanied by price limits associated with excessive liquidity tension.  
 
To avoid the risk of the market being able to predict the trade schedule 
implemented with POV, order aggressiveness and placement is often adjusted with 
tilting deterministic parameters. Further, some safeguards are often inserted in order to 
prevent excessive fluctuation of market volume. This is usually obtained by inserting 
the maximum trade size.  
 
A variant of POV is offered by its price-adaptive version. In this case, the 
participation rate is adjusted according to how the market price compares to a 
benchmark, which could be either a market index or an exchanged traded fund- (ETF) 
based index. Trade aggressiveness is reduced when price tension is high and relaxed if 
price tension is low. Another modification of the POV strategy can be implemented 
when another type of price condition is added to the algorithm such that child orders 
are not going to receive a price higher than the last trade or the current best bid.  
 
Overall, the dynamical features of POV make this algorithm more attractive 
and less forecastable than the simple VWAP or TWAP. However, regulatory 
authorities are now leading market participants to adopt variants of POV that may not 
endanger the safety of the market as a whole. In this case, including as such variants as 
an adjustment mechanism towards a market benchmark with mandatory parameters 
may be possible. Currently, no formal prescriptions made by SEC, FSA or other 
regulatory agencies exist so more research needed in this field.  
 
4.2 Opportunistic Algorithms 
Opportunistic algorithms are designed to take advantage of favorable market 
conditions. Liquidity-driven algorithms designed to search for liquidity across several 
market venues play a key role in this process. After the introduction of algorithms, 
liquidity has become even more central in judging the quality of market status. 
Traditionally, liquidity has been associated with lower bid-ask spreads, focusing 
exclusively on the explicit transaction costs. As this paper will clarify after the 
presentation of transaction costs analysis, a non-liquid asset implies excessive price 
volatility after a trade, signalling a trading activity even slightly above what the market 
may expect. The increasing degree of fragmentation occurring in modern markets 
delivers a more careful definition of opportunistic algorithms. In this context, liquidity-
driven opportunistic algorithms are designed to search for liquidity over multiple 
execution venues. The most important element is given by liquidity aggregation across 
venues with technology that is able to collect order book data from all possible venues 
for the purpose of collecting everything into a unique order book. The design of a 
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proper opportunistic algorithm should take into account the following: (1) the fee 
structure associated to each trading venue; (2) the latency, which in this case represents 
the time lag between orders sent and processed from each single venue; and (3) the 
probability of execution associated to each trading venue. Orders are aggregated by 
using price priority and then by the probability of execution.  
 
Given that algorithms are designed to capture the performance of the entire 
order book, implementing a way to track the behavior of the order book over time is 
extremely important. In this context, historical data analysis and a close monitoring 
scheme of the order book may help in estimating hidden liquidity. Often, the setup of 
the opportunistic algorithm includes specific actions such as “pinging for liquidity” in 
the book of a given trading venue. This practice consists of inserting a specific type of 
order like IOC or FOK to test for liquidity inside the order book. If an IOC or FOK gets 
executed, then hidden liquidity exists on the book.  
 
In practice, opportunistic algorithms represent a form of liquidity-seeking 
strategies that do not react to traded volume. Instead, it is the market depth, reflecting 
the volume at each favorable price point that represents the indicator leading the 
strategies of the algorithm. When prices are favorable, the algorithm is designed to 
trade more aggressively to consume liquidity. When market conditions are 
unfavorable, participation trade falls to zero. Of course, in this context, liquidity plays a 
crucial role. With such types of algorithms, orders do not necessarily complete. The 
algorithm often contains a set of warnings about the liquidity situation of a given 
security in each trading venue. Some of the key parameters to be specified at the order 
initiation include visibility and benchmark practice. Visibility specifies how much of 
the order may actually be displayed at each execution venue. For example, in the case 
of low visibility, IOC order types are largely employed. An alternative to this is 
represented by processing the order through dark pools. The role of benchmark pricing 
is employed to decide if the security’s price is favorable enough to measure 
participation.  
 
 
5. PRE-TRADE AND POST-TRADE ANALYSIS  
 
In trading activity, the role of transactions is crucial and an accurate quantification 
of them helps traders to properly decide when and where to make transactions. In this 
context, pre-trade analysis is very important because it helps traders to make informal 
decisions about the best order execution. Pre-trade analysis is conducted by using 
information coming from data. There are two sources of information employed for this 
type of analysis. The first source comes from information relative to fundamentals of 
securities such as price/earnings for stocks and coupons for fixed income. The second 
source emerges from trade-related sources: prices, liquidity, and cost estimates.  
 
Information is gathered from trade-related sources relative to price ranges, 
trends, momentum. Obtaining liquidity information permits getting average daily 
volume (ADV), volume profile, and indicators of trading stability. Risk indicators 
include volatility, beta, and risk exposure. Cost estimates are defined by measures of 
market impact and timing risk. The estimate of transaction costs implies exactly the 
importance and the difficulty of executing a given order.  
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Post-trade analysis delivers results about broker/trader performance for both 
investment and execution decisions. The key element of the post-trade analysis is 
obtained by breaking down costs into several components including fees and 
commissions. With post-trade analysis, establishing the relative performance, net of 
costs, is possible for the trading activity implemented by a trader. Within this context, 
the choice of the benchmark becomes essential in performance computations. The 
average execution price of any given trades has to be compared with a benchmark. 
Post-trade benchmarks are based on closing prices. The main purpose of these 
benchmarks is to determine the mark-to-market computation and profit and loss. The 
problem with closing prices is their scarce representative power of real market 
conditions. An algorithm can be designed in order to track closing prices. However, 
closing prices tend to be more sensitive to the order flow than in other periods during 
the day. This situation implies that orders can be more exposed to timing risk and to 
more volatile conditions.  
 
Intra-day benchmarks are generally given in the following manner: (1) the 
average of open-high, low-close, (2) TWAP and (3) VWAP. The average of the open-
high represents an average over only four data points and can be easily distorted by 
extreme values TWAP represents an average of all observed trade price over a given 
timing period. Thus, all trades are weighted equally, which has the drawback that 
smaller trades occurring at extreme prices may markedly affect TWAP calculations. 
However, TWAP is generally employed when trade volume data are unavailable. In 
general, VWAP is probably the fairest indication of how market prices have changed 
over a specific time span. VWAP does not have a strong impact on small trades and 
can be considered as a very good representation of average market conditions. A 
higher value of VWAP indicates a higher market impact determined by the last trade. 
Conversely, VWAP does not deliver good performance when the sample of analysis 
includes large order or when the volatility of orders is large. At the same time, market 
conditions that include large price reversals do not represent an ideal context to apply 
VWAP.  
 
5.1 Pre-trade analysis 
Pre-trade benchmarks can be distinguished into those that are directly available 
and those that not publicly observable. Directly available benchmarks are represented 
by the previous close and opening price. Such benchmarks do not necessarily reflect 
actual market conditions during the trading day. Other useful prices include the 
decision price and arrival price. The decision price is the price at which the choice to 
invest has been actually made.  The decision price is used in the calculations related to 
implementation shortfall, which will be discussed in a later section. The arrival price is 
the price registered at the time when the order was actually traded, which is the time at 
which the order arrives from the investor. The problem with such information is that 
the decision/arrival price is not always recorded by the investor.  
 
Kissel and Glantz (2003) propose a Relative Performance Measure (RPM) based 
on the comparison of what the trade achieved in relation to market condition. Equation 
(4) presents RPM for volume while Equation (5) gives the RPM for trades.  
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     (5) 
 
 
 
The advantage of RPM is that it is already normalized in percentage terms. For 
example, a trade achieving 90 percent of RPM is better than another trade reaching 60 
percent.  
 
5.2 Post Trade Transaction Costs 
The most important measure of performance in post-trade analysis is 
implementation shortfall (IS), which is the difference between the price that an investor 
decides to trade and the average execution price that is actually achieved. The decision 
price is the benchmark. If the decision price is not specified, the mid price is generally 
accepted as default benchmark.  Perold’s (1988) measure of IS consists of comparing 
the return on a “paper” (hypothetical) portfolio with the return obtained in the real, 
actually traded portfolio as shown in Equation (6).  
 
                                       (6) 
 
The performance of the theoretical or paper portfolio depends on three factors: (1) the 
price where the decision to invest was made, Pd; (2) the final market price PN; and (3) 
the size of the intended investment X. More formally, given xj the size of the jth order, 
with achieved price pj, the IS can be defined as shown in Equation (7):  
 
                (    ∑            )       (7) 
 
Assuming that the order is fully executed, the IS measure, as shown in Equation (8), 
becomes:  
 
       ∑                           (8) 
 
If the order is not fully executed, the IS can be rewritten as shown in Equation (9):  
 
                        ∑       (∑    )  ⏟        
               
 (  ∑    )       ⏟     
                
                  (9) 
where   ∑     indicates the size of the unexecuted position.  
 
According to Kissel and Glantz (2003), transaction costs can be classified in two 
ways: (1) fixed and variable and (2) visible and transparent. Typically, visible costs 
cannot be managed, while non-transparent components are manageable through an 
appropriate execution strategy.  
 
The Perold’s IS measure can be expanded by adding investment-related delay 
costs, as suggested by Wagner and Glass (2001). In this case, the expanded measure of 
transaction costs is given in Equation (10):  
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          (10) 
 
where X indicates the total amount of shares traded at jth transaction; Pj is the price of 
the jth transaction; Pd is the price observed at the time of investment decision; P0 is the 
price at time when the order is released to the market; Pn is the price at the end of 
trading session; and n is the total number of trading periods.  
 
Cost minimization strategies focus on developing analytical methods to 
manage trade-related transaction costs. Minimization of delay costs and opportunity 
costs is a natural consequence of adopting a fast trading method, with the ability of 
minimizing trade latency as much as possible. The rapid increase of HFT techniques 
and infrastructures is motivated by the need to minimize delay and opportunity costs. 
The design of an optimal execution method allows reducing the trade-related 
component of transaction costs.  
 
 
6. OPTIMAL EXECUTION STRATEGIES  
 
Trading activity is a complex set of strategies, market conditions, and costs. 
Trading too aggressively produces a higher market impact. Conversely, trading too 
passively implies a higher timing risk. In general, optimal execution strategies attempt 
to find a balance between these two extremes. Synthetically, the optimal execution 
strategies can be represented by Figure 1. 
 
(Insert Figure 1 about here) 
 
The market impact is decreasing over time by trading strategies, while timing 
risk increases over time. The optimal execution strategies mix up the balance between 
these two cost measures. In general, the optimal solution is determined by the trader’s 
degree of risk aversion. The balance between market impact and timing risk defines the 
famous optimal trading horizon.  
 
The design of an optimal algorithm has the goal of minimizing total costs 
related to trading activity. The characteristics of a transparent and efficient algorithm 
are given by two elements: (1) the choice of a desired benchmark price (close, open, 
and arrival) and (2) the choice of a desired trading style: aggressive, normal, moderate, 
including the choice of market adaptation (representing the choice about how the 
algorithm should adapt to market conditions). Algorithms should built in order to 
balance the tradeoff between market impact and timing risk over the trading horizon. 
According to Kissel and Glantz (2003), market impact is the movement in stock caused 
by the order or the trade. Permanent impact costs are the result of an information 
leakage. Almgren and Chriss (2000) focus on designing optimal execution strategies. 
The difficulty with their approach is the need to determine an approximate market 
impact function at the trade level that also takes into account price movements. Kissel 
and Malamut (2006) solve this problem by considering a top-down approach, where 
the average market impact cost is estimated for aggregated trade imbalance and 
allocated to trading periods.  
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According to Kissel and Malamut (2006), the impact cost is defined according to 
Equation (11):  
        (
 
   
)
  
                 (11) 
where X is the number of shares contained in the order; ADV is the average daily 
trading volume; σ is the annualized volatility; and P0 is the current price. The market 
impact function is given in Equation (12):  
 
          ∑
     
 
 (        )
 
   ⏟    
                 
        ⏟  
                  
        (12) 
where xj indicates the number of shares transacted in period j; vj is the expected volume 
(net of the order) in period j; and b1 is the percentage of temporary market impact costs. 
Assuming the existence of a constant trading rate, Equation (13) emerges in the 
following manner:  
       
  
  
      (13) 
After rearrangement (Kissel and Malamut, 2006), the entire expression can be rewritten 
for the market impact given in Equation (12) as a function of the trading rate shown in 
Equation (14):  
         (
   
 
) (
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       ⏟  
 ⏟  
  
           
(14) 
which, after rearrangement, becomes Equation (15):  
             
 
 ⁄              (15) 
Equation (16) provides an alternative formulation for market impact:  
 
         ⏟
   
[            ]⏟     
    
        (16) 
where I(Q,σ) is the trade impact function whose arguments are market imbalance Q 
and volatility σ. Function      is the dissipation function, where         ⁄  and 
      ∑        (  ) indicates the cumulative amount of order on the same side of the 
market (in buy or in sell, according to the sign of vj).  
 
Given the above information, the problem of optimal trade execution consists in 
finding the optimal trading rate that minimizes the cost, given the risk. Formally, the 
problem can be stated in Equation (17):  
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          (17) 
 
where    is the threshold level of timing risk. Following Kissel and Glantz (2003), the 
timing risk is the uncertainty surrounding the expected market impact cost that is 
related with volume and intraday volume patterns. By definition, timing risk is given 
in Equation (18):  
 
            √∑   
  
   
   
 
         (18) 
 
In terms of the trading rate α, the timing risk can be reformulated as shown in Equation 
(19):  
          √
 
  
          
(19) 
 
The goal of finding optimal execution consists of finding the trading rate α which 
minimizes the expression in Equation (20):    
 
                                   {           }         
(20) 
 
A crucial parameter in Equation (20) is λ, which represents the degree of risk aversion 
of the trader. In other words, choosing the value of λ can affect the aggressiveness of 
the trading strategy. A lower λ indicates a patient trader because less weight is 
assigned to timing risk and more weight is assigned to trading cost. Conversely, a 
higher λ implies a more aggressive trading strategy with higher weights assigned to 
market impact costs and lower weights assigned to timing risk.  
 
Figure 1 captures a pictorial representation of the optimization procedure. The  
figure illustrates the evolution of market impact cost and timing risk as a function of 
trading rates. Clearly, the optimal trading rate is obtained as the minimum point of the 
curve outlined by Equation (20), for any given level of risk aversion λ. Given the 
optimal strategy, which is defined in terms of the trading rate as a function of the 
parameters and exogenous variables of the model, Equation (20), conditional to the 
optimal solution, delivers the efficient trading frontier (ETF) as defined by Almgren 
and Chriss (2000). In Figure 2, the ETF is shown for two given levels of price 
benchmarks adopted to study trade performance.  
 
(Insert Figure 2 about here) 
The dotted-line ETF has been constructed adopting the previous close price as a 
benchmark, while the solid-line ETF is based on the arrival price. In general the ETF 
computed with previous close price can be above or below ETF conditional to arrival 
price for two reasons.  First, the ETF includes permanent price impacts, not just the 
temporary component. Second, the ETF includes price movements between the time of 
investment decisions and the trade starting time.  
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By definition, the ETF is the locus of all optimal trading strategies, i.e., the least 
cost for a given level of timing risk and the lowest timing risk for a specified cost. An 
efficient strategy is on the ETF. All strategies above the ETF are inefficient, in the sense 
that finding another strategy with lower timing risk, given the expected cost and/or a 
lower expected cost, given the timing risk, is always possible. Movements along the 
curve are governed by the size of parameter λ. That is, if λ is higher (implying a more 
aggressive trading strategy), the optimal trading point will be located in the top left 
part of the curve, while for lower λ, the solution will be associated with lower expected 
cost and higher timing risk.  
 
The notion of the ETF has recently expanded to several other optimal trading 
models that include the uncertainty of prices. Almgren (2012) develops an optimal 
trading model with an arithmetical Brownian motion process for the stock prices. 
Gatheral and Schied (2011) expand their optimal trading model on the basis of 
geometric Brownian motion. This area of research is rapidly expanding which is not 
surprising given the strong impact that this type of research will have in the design of 
trading strategies and on its global market impact.  
 
 
7. EXECUTION TACTICS 
 
 Passive approaches adopt limit orders priced at or behind the market whereas 
aggressive approaches adopt either market or marketable orders. Neutral tactics tend 
to be more flexible. They start passively to seek price improvement. If they fail, these 
neutral tactics should be replaced with more aggressive ones. A more dynamic tactic 
strategy considers market conditions and adapts strategy to it. Broadly speaking, 
execution tactics may be classified on the basis of the goals that drive their usage: 
 Impact-driven tactics seek to further reduce market impact by splitting the order 
into smaller quantities or by hiding a portion of it.  
 Price/risk driven approaches strive to dynamically adjust based on market 
conditions.  
 Opportunistic tactics seek out advantages when conditions are favorable. 
  
7.1 Impact-driven Tactics 
Slicing 
Order slicing is the precursor to the early schedule-driven algorithms. Reducing the 
size of an order can lower its market impact and any associated signaling risk. 
Randomization is a way of further reducing signaling risk. This reduction applies to 
both quantities to be split and the time between each child order. When adopted 
sequentially, order slicing effectively acts as a hiding mechanism. The strategy may be 
adopted to create synthetic iceberg orders for venues that do not natively support this 
order type. For native iceberg orders, the hidden portion is still part of the order book 
so it may still participate in the trade crossing mechanism, with only price priority. 
Order slicing, instead, relies on execution confirmations to know when next to send 
another order slice. These orders are dispatched after a matching process is employed. 
In this way, a trader may miss some crossing opportunities. For example, consider a 
requirement to sell 10,000 shares of ABC stock from which the trader has split an initial 
child order for 1,000 shares at 51 as S1. The main advantage of order slicing is that the 
trader has much more control of the display size. In this case, the second order can be 
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split with a random size, rather than simply splitting 1,000 shares each time. Order 
slicing can be also applied in parallel, allowing simultaneous trading across several 
execution venues. The example reported in Table 3 represents the effect of an order to 
buy 2,200 shares on the order book.   
 
(Insert Table 3 about here) 
 
In Panel B, note the highlighted effect due to MO crosses. In Panel C, note that for a 
synthetic iceberg order, an immediate cross exists for orders S1 and S2 at 51. The next 
cross will be with S3 at 52. After the venue sends confirmation for these fills, there will 
be another split for S6 for 850 shares. In Panel D, the table illustrates the effects from a 
native iceberg. In this case, the hidden size completes the market order at 51. A new 
display size would have been split as order S6, 400 shares of which complete the 
market order, the remaining 600 shares stay on the order book. 
 
Hiding 
Hiding is associated with reducing signaling risk, which is the potential information 
that trading pattern relays to other market participants. The example reported in Table 
4 records large block orders.  
 
(Insert Table 4 about here) 
 
Algorithmic orders are implicitly hidden because most strategies only release a small 
portion of the order for immediate trading. Liquidity is another critical variable 
because even a small order may have important price effects in case of illiquid assets. 
Discretionary orders allow a trader to hide his actual limit price. In Panel A, the 
intention to execute an order S3 with a limit price 52 exists even though the trader was 
prepared to trade at 51. The trader could increase his discretionary amount to shift his 
order deeper in the order book. This change would place more orders in front of the 
trader in terms of execution priority. Iceberg orders allow the trader to display only a 
portion of the order, with the remaining portion retains price priority. For example in 
Panel B, 1,000 shares are displayed with the remaining 7,000 shares hidden until S3 is 
completed, although it will maintain price priority over S4. This example illustrates the 
importance of obtaining the right balance between the visible and hidden parts. 
Smaller trades may take too long to complete with larger visible portions having 
greater predictability.  
 
7.2 Price Risk Driven Tactics  
 Price risk driven tactics are based on changes in the spread and short-term price 
trends. As the gap between the best bid and offer narrows, a trader can afford to pay 
the spread, and the tactics may indicate issuing more marketable limit orders or market 
orders. When the spread widens, more passive pricing is used. Market conditions are 
also important. In a favorable price trend, a passive trading style tends to price orders 
farther away from market to try to take maximum advantage of price improvements. 
Conversely, during unfavorable price trends, a passive strategy may price orders closer 
to the market in order to reduce potential losses. Aggressive price strategies tend to 
rely on trends mean reverting so that they behave in the opposite fashion.  
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Risk-driven tactics consider the asset’s price volatility and how much time is 
left to execute. The tactics may be combined to create a timing factor, which can be 
incorporated into order placement decisions. For a liquid asset at the start of the 
execution, the timing factor is minor, but increases over time. For less liquid assets, the 
timing factor is more important. Other execution tactics are defined as catching, which 
is based on cutting the losses when the price looks to be trending away.  
  
 The layering tactic simultaneously maintains a range of standing limit orders. 
Orders are spread throughout the order book, usually with different limit prices. This 
approach attempts to take advantage of favorable price movements. With price/time 
priority, layering allows for the preservation of time priority for each order. This 
occurs because as the market price moves, a new order can be split, rather than just 
updating an existing order to match the new level. Time priority is very important for 
liquid stocks that have a densely populated order book. If time priority is lost, the only 
way to regain it is with a more aggressive price. In general, layering is useful for highly 
liquid assets with dense order books, where achieving time priority is difficult. In this 
way we can track price moves without significantly affecting our overall execution 
probability.  
 
7.3 Opportunistic Tactics 
These tactics tend to maximize the benefits from favorable market conditions, such 
as liquidity. Three types of such tactics follow.  
 Seeking: This tactic aims to source additional liquidity from hidden orders. 
Seeking tactics may also focus on reducing signaling risk. Monitoring the state 
of the order book can enable creating models to estimate the probability of how 
much volume is hidden at the various price levels throughout the order book. 
Another important concern when searching for liquidity is to keep orders 
hidden. The goal is to fill the orders at the best price possible without giving 
away information about the actual requirements. The choice is between various 
fill instructions available for limit orders. Only IOC or FOK are suitable because 
the others all leave residual orders on the order book. IOC allows partial fills 
whereas FOK is a strict execution.  
 Sniping: This tactic allows the capture of liquidity while minimizing signaling 
risk. The tactic is a way for liquidity demanding traders to hide their strategy. 
As such, sniping is a variation of the seeking tactic for visible liquidity. To 
reduce signaling risk, traders use marketable limit orders with specific fill 
instructions. When liquidity becomes available, an aggressive order is used to 
cross with it. 
  Routing: This tactic chooses the best destinations to send orders. Many factors 
have to be analyzed before deciding where to send an order including: (1) the 
probability of hidden liquidity; (2) the likelihood of successful execution; () 
latency; and (4) the venue specific costs or fees. Routing mechanisms make 
these decisions, based on available market data. Liquidity aggregation is the 
key aspect for trading in a fragmented market. Virtual order books can be 
formed by collecting data from all possible execution venues.  
 
 
8. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
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This paper presents the key piece of knowledge to follow based on the most recent 
advances in market evolutions, mainly represented by HFT and AT. The order 
characteristics and all the variants of the basic limit and market order types are 
considered for different trading needs. Given that AT and HFT involve using a specific 
trading strategy, the paper also presents the main characteristics of the most often 
employed trading strategies such as VWAP, TWAP, POV and others. Implicit and 
explicit transaction costs are also introduced, which are at the core of the choice process 
of an optimal trading strategy.  Also introduced is the optimal trade execution of 
Kissell and Malamut (2006) together with a full description of the EFT.  
 
The material covered in this paper is evolving quickly and is new to the 
microstructure literature. The authors believe that adopting HFT and AT will radically 
modify the way in which researchers and practitioners approach the field of market 
microstructure and market architecture. Many research areas are now open to these 
new advances, which challenge traditional concepts about market quality, liquidity, 
and price discovery. HFT has a role in propagating liquidity shortages and generating 
market crashes. While limited research exists on this topic, the design of optimal 
execution methods that do not endanger market conditions will be the challenge for 
the future.  
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Table 1 Hidden Order Example  
 
This table contains the behavior of the order book when hidden orders are 
implemented.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2 Hidden Order Example  
 
This table highlights the evolution of the order book after the introduction of an 
iceberg order.  
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Figure 1  
 
This figure shows the market impact cost and timing risk as a function of the trading 
rate. The optimal trading rate is obtained from the minimum point on the curve 
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Figure 2 
 
This figure shows the ETF computed as conditional to two prices: previous close and 
arrival price.  
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Table 3 Slicing Execution Tactics Example  
 
Panel A. Before: Incoming Market Order to Buy 2200  
 
 
 
Panel B. Market Order Crosses  
 
 
 
Panel C.  After for a Synthetic Iceberg  
 
 
 
Panel D. For a Native  
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Table 4 Hiding Execution Tactics Example  
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
